Glossary
A bear market is a sustained fall of 20 percent or more from a high - the ASX lost more than half in the GFC and a third in five weeks in 2020. The market recovers; the balances that panic-sold often do not.
A bear market is a sustained fall of 20 percent or more from a recent high, driven by recession, rate rises or a repricing of whatever the optimism had built. The ASX has run through several: the GFC took the index down by more than half between 2007 and 2009, early 2020 took a third off in five weeks, and 2022 subtracted roughly a fifth. A fall of 10 to 20 percent is a correction; the bear market is the bigger sibling.
The arithmetic is the part that changes behaviour. A 50 percent fall requires a 100 percent rise to recover; a 33 percent fall requires 50 percent. The asymmetry is why the fall hurts more than the recovery pays, and why the balances that sold near the bottom missed the climb - the volatility entry covers the daily swings, and the behaviour is the real cost. The market has recovered from every Australian bear market; the portfolios that sat through them did too.
Walk the anatomy. Earnings expectations fall, the cash rate rises, or the optimism reprices - and the selling feeds on itself as margin calls and redemptions force more selling. The media coverage turns, the inflows of the bull market reverse, and the index falls faster than the economics alone justify. The ASX fell roughly a third in five weeks in March 2020 - the economics did not change that much in five weeks; the selling did.
The recovery arithmetic is the second mechanism, and the asymmetric one. A portfolio that falls 50 percent needs 100 percent to return to its high; one that falls 33 percent needs 50 percent. The ASX recovered its 2020 drawdown inside a year, and its 2007 high took over a decade - the recovery time is never knowable in advance, which is why the cash buffer matters. An investor who sold in March 2009 waited years to re-enter at higher prices; the investor who held recovered with the market.
The sequence risk is the third mechanism, and the retiree's version. A portfolio drawing $25,000 a year through a 30 percent drawdown sells assets at the bottom to fund the income, and the withdrawals compound the loss - the balance that would have recovered now shrinks permanently. The first years of retirement are the dangerous ones, and the emergency fund entry covers the buffer that funds the gap instead of the portfolio. Younger investors have the opposite advantage: time, and contributions buying through the fall.
For an Australian reader, the bear market is the reason the allocation decision exists at all. The ASX has recovered from every one of them, and the long-run return with dividends reinvested is roughly 8 to 9 percent - both facts are true at the same time. The risk tolerance entry sizes the allocation to the drawdown you can actually sit through, and the drawdown risk calculator puts numbers on it. MoneySmart guidance treats market falls as part of investing, not a failure of it.
A colleague named Brent (yes, that Brent) sold his entire portfolio in November 2008 because the balance kept falling. The index bottomed in March 2009 and recovered over the following decade; he re-entered in 2012, at prices well above the ones he sold at. The bear market was survivable; his behaviour was not. The highest-leverage thing most Australians can do is size the allocation so the worst realistic drawdown is survivable, keep three to six months of essentials in cash, and hold the rest through the fall.
A $100,000 portfolio that falls 50 percent is worth $50,000, and needs a 100 percent rise to return to the high. The same portfolio falling 33 percent needs 50 percent; falling 20 percent needs 25 percent. The asymmetry is why large drawdowns are the expensive ones, and why the allocation sized to the worst realistic fall is the decision that matters. The drawdown risk calculator runs the arithmetic at any fall size, and the risk tolerance entry sizes the allocation against it.
The ASX 200 fell by more than half between November 2007 and March 2009. The investor who sold near the bottom at $60,000 and re-entered in 2012 watched the index recover for years before his balance did; the investor who held recovered with the market. The bear market lasted seventeen months; the behavioural damage lasted longer. Brent's version of the same decade cost roughly a third of the recovery.
A retiree drawing $25,000 a year from a $500,000 portfolio meets a 30 percent drawdown in the first two years of retirement. The income forces sales of roughly $50,000 at depressed prices, and the balance that would have recovered now compounds from a permanently smaller base. The same retiree with a two-year cash buffer draws from cash instead and leaves the portfolio untouched. The first years of retirement are the ones the allocation protects.
Mistake: Selling near the bottom to stop the pain.
Why it bites you: The sale locks the loss and misses the recovery, and the re-entry usually happens at higher prices. Brent's 2008 sale cost roughly a third of the index's recovery.
Mistake: Confusing a correction with a bear market.
Why it bites you: A 10 to 20 percent fall is a correction - painful, and historically routine. Panicking on a correction converts a routine dip into a permanent loss.
Mistake: Holding everything in cash waiting for the bottom.
Why it bites you: The bottom is only knowable in hindsight, and the cash waiting for it misses the recovery's first and largest days. The [emergency fund entry](/glossary/emergency-fund/) covers the buffer that should exist instead.
Mistake: Ignoring sequence risk in the first retirement years.
Why it bites you: Drawdowns early in retirement force asset sales at the bottom and compound permanently. The cash buffer that funds the income through the fall is the fix.
I spent an evening with the ASX's drawdown history and the drawdown risk calculator running the recovery arithmetic at five fall sizes so you don't have to. The asymmetry never moves: the bigger the fall, the bigger the required climb, and the required climb is why bear markets are the expensive part of investing. Every Australian bear market recovered; the ones that did not were the portfolios that sold.
Brent sold in November 2008 because the balance kept falling, and bought the recovery twice. The market did not care about his feelings; the arithmetic did not care about his timing. Size the allocation to the fall you can sit through, keep the buffer in cash, and let the recovery do its work. The bear market is survivable; the panic is not.
A sustained fall of 20 percent or more from a recent high, usually driven by recession, rate rises or a repricing. A 10 to 20 percent fall is a correction.
The ASX recovered its 2020 drawdown inside a year; the 2007 high took over a decade. The recovery time is unknowable in advance, which is why the allocation matters more than the forecast.
The timing that avoids the falls also misses the recovery's largest days, which cluster immediately after the worst ones. Sizing the allocation to the drawdown you can sit through beats predicting the fall.
Sequence risk: drawdowns in the first retirement years force asset sales at the bottom and compound permanently. A cash buffer covering two to three years of income is the standard fix.
Roughly every five to ten years on the ASX, with corrections between them more frequently. The long-run return with dividends reinvested survives them; concentrated and panic-sold portfolios often do not.
Disclaimer: This information is general in nature and does not constitute financial or legal advice. Always consult a qualified professional for your specific situation.

Financial Chaos Analyst
Ivy Sinclair-Wren is a Financial Chaos Analyst covering investing, AI, wealth psychology, and the emotional consequences of opening finance apps during market crashes. Based in Melbourne, she specializes in demystifying the Australian tax code and helping users navigate the intersection of spreadsheet logic and human irrationality.